A theory of measurement uncertainty is presented, which, since it is based exclusively on the Bayesian approach and on the subjective concept of conditional probability, is applicable in the most general cases.
Introduction
The value of a physical quantity obtained as a result of a measurement has a degree of uncertainty, due to unavoidable errors, of which one can recognize the source but never establish the exact magnitude. The uncertainty due to so called statistical errors is usually treated using the frequentistic concept of confidence intervals, although the procedure is rather unnatural and there are known cases (of great relevance in frontier research) in which this approach is not applicable. On the other hand, there is no way, within this frame, to handle uncertainties due to systematic errors in a consistent way.
Bayesian statistics, however, allows a theory of measurement uncertainty to be built which is applicable to all cases. The outcomes are in agreement with the recommendation of the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) and of the International Organization for the Standardization (ISO), which has also recognized the crucial role of subjective probability in assessing and expressing measurement uncertainty.
In the next section I will make some remarks about the implicit use in science of the intuitive concept of probability as degree of belief. Then I will briefly discuss the part of the BIPM recommendation which deals with subjective probability. The Bayesian theory of uncertainty which provides the mathematical foundation of the recommendation will be commented upon. Finally I will introduce an alternative theory, based exclusively on the Bayesian approach and on conditional probability. More details, including many practical examples, can be found in [1] .
Claimed frequentism versus practiced subjectivism
Most physicists (I deal here mainly with Physics because of personal biases, but the remarks and the conclusions could easily be extended to other fields of research) have received a scientific education in which the concept of probability is related to the ratio of favorable over possible events, and to relative frequencies for the outcomes of repeated experiments. Usually the first "definition" (combinatorial) is used in theoretical calculations and the second one (frequentistic) in empirical evaluations. The subjective definition of probability, as "degree of belief", is, instead, viewed with suspicion and usually misunderstood. The usual criticism is that "science must be objective" and, hence that "there should be no room for subjectivity". Some even say: "I do not believe something. I assess it. This is not a matter for religion!".
It is beyond the purposes of this paper to discuss the issue of the so called "objectivity" of scientific results. I would just like to remind the reader that, as well expressed by the science historian Galison [2] In my experience, and after interviewing many colleagues from several countries, physicists use (albeit unconsciously) the intuitive concept of probability as "degree of belief", even for "professional purposes". Nevertheless, they have difficulty in accepting such a definition rationally, because -in my opinion -of their academic training. For example, apart from a small minority of orthodox frequentists, almost everybody accepts statements of the kind "there is 90 % probability that the value of the Top quark mass is between . . . ". In general, in fact, even the frequentistic concept of confidence interval is usually interpreted in a subjective way, and the correct statement (according to the frequentistic school) of "90 % probability that the observed value lies in an interval around µ" is usually turned around into a "90 % probability that µ is around the observed value" (µ indicates hereafter the true value). The reason is rather simple. A physicist -to continue with our exampleseeks to obtain some knowledge about µ and, consciously or not, wants to understand which values of µ have high or low degrees of belief; or which intervals ∆µ have large or small probability. A statement concerning the probability that a measured value falls within a certain interval around µ is sterile if it cannot be turned into an expression which states the quality of the knowledge of µ itself. Unfortunately, few scientists are aware that this can be done in a logically consistent way only by using the Bayes' theorem and someà priori degrees of belief. In practice, since one often deals with simple problems in which the likelihood is normal and the uniform distribution is a reasonable prior (in the sense that the same degree of belief is assigned to all the infinite values of µ) the Bayes' formula is formally "by-passed" and the likelihood is taken as if it described the degrees of belief for µ after the outcome of the experiment is known (i.e. the final probability density function, if µ is a continuous quantity).
BIPM and ISO Recommendation on the measurement uncertainty
An example which shows how this intuitive way of reasoning is so natural for the physicist can be found in the BIPM recommendation INC-1 (1980) about the "expression of experimental uncertainty" [3] . It states that
The uncertainty in the result of a measurement generally consists of several components which may be grouped into two categories according to the way in which their numerical value is estimated:
A: those which are evaluated by statistical methods; B: those which are evaluated by other means.
Then it specifies that
The components in category B should be characterized by quantities u 2 j , which may be considered as approximations to the corresponding variances, the existence of which is assumed. The quantities u 2 j may be treated like variances and the quantities u j like standard deviations.
Clearly, this recommendation is meaningful only in a Bayesian framework. In fact, the recommendation has been criticized because it is not supported by conventional statistics (see e.g. [4] and references therein). Nevertheless, it has been approved and reaffirmed by the CIPM (Comité International des Poids et Mesures) and adopted by ISO in its "Guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement" [5] and by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) in an analogous guide [6] . In particular, the ISO Guide recognizes the crucial role of subjective probability in Type B uncertainties: The BIPM recommendation and the ISO Guide deal only with definitions and with "variance propagation", performed, as usual, by linearization. A general theory has been proposed by Weise and Wöger [4] . which they maintain should provide the mathematical foundation of the Guide. Their theory is based on Bayesian statistics and on the principle of maximum entropy. Although the authors show how powerful it is in many applications, the use of the maximum entropy principle is, in my opinion, a weak point which prevents the theory from being as general as claimed (see the remarks later on in this paper, on the choice of the priors) and which makes the formalism rather complicated. I show in the next section how it is possible to build an alternative theory, based exclusively on probability "first principles", which is very close to the physicist's intuition. In a certain sense the theory which will be proposed here can be seen as nothing more than a formalization of what most physicists unconsciously do.
A genuine Bayesian theory of measurement uncertainty
In the Bayesian framework inference is performed by calculating the degrees of belief of the true values of the physical quantities, taking into account all the available information. Let us call x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nx } the n-tuple ("vector") of observables, µ = {µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ nµ } the n-tuple of the true values of the physical quantities of interest, and h = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n h } the n-tuple of all the possible realizations of the influence variables H i . The term "influence variable" is used here with an extended meaning, to indicate not only external factors which could influence the result (temperature, atmospheric pressure, etc.) but also any possible calibration constants and any source of systematic errors. In fact the distinction between µ and h is artificial, since they are all conditional hypotheses for x. We separate them simply because the aim of the research is to obtain knowledge about µ, while h are considered a nuisance.
The likelihood of the sample x being produced from h and µ is
H • is intended as a reminder that likelihoods and priors -and hence conclusions -depend on all explicit and implicit assumptions within the problem, and, in particular, on the parametric functions used to model priors and likelihoods. (To simplify the formulae, H • will no longer be written explicitly). Notice that (1) has to be meant as a function f (·|µ, h) for all possible values of the sample x, with no restrictions beyond those given by the coherence [7] . Using the Bayes' theorem we obtain, given an initial f • (µ) which describes the different degrees of belief on all possible values of µ before the information on x is available, a final distribution f (µ) for each possible set of values of the influence variables h:
Notice that the integral over a probability density function (instead of a summation over discrete cases) is just used to simplify the notation. To obtain the final distribution of µ one needs to re-weight (2) with the degrees of belief on h:
The same comment on the use of the integration, made after (2), applies here. Although (3) is seldom used by physicists, the formula is conceptually equivalent to what experimentalists do when they vary all the parameters of the Monte Carlo simulation in order to estimate the "systematic error" 1 .
Notice that an alternative way of getting f (µ) would be to first consider an initial joint probability density function f • (µ, h) and then to obtain f (µ) as the marginal of the final distribution f (µ, h). Formula (3) is reobtained if µ and h are independent and if f • (µ, h) can be factorized into f • (µ) and f (h). But this could be interpreted as an explicit requirement that f (µ, h) exists, or even that the existence of f (µ, h) is needed for the assessment of f (x|µ, h). As stated previously, f (x|µ, h) simply describes the degree of belief on x for any conceivable configuration {µ, h}, with no constraint other than coherence. This corresponds to what experimentalists do when they first give the result with "statistical uncertainty" only and then look for all possible systematic effects and evaluate their related contributions to the "global uncertainty".
Some comments about the choice of the priors I don't think that the problem of the prior choice is a fundamental issue. My view is that one should avoid pedantic discussions of the matter, because the idea of "universally true priors" reminds me terribly of the Byzanthine "angels' sex" debates. If I had to give recommendations, they would be:
• the a priori probability should be chosen in the same spirit as the rational person who places a bet, seeking to minimize the risk of losing;
• general principles may help, but, since it is difficult to apply elegant theoretical ideas to all practical situations, in many circumstances the guess of the "expert" can be relied on for guidance;
• in particular, I think -and in this respect I completely disagree with the authors of [4] -there is no reason why the maximum entropy principle should be used in an uncertainty theory, just because it is successful in statistical mechanics. In my opinion, while the use of this principle in the case of discrete random variables is as founded as Laplace's indifference principle, in the continuous case there exists the unavoidable problem of the choice of the right metric ("what is uniform in x is not uniform in x 2 "). It seems to me that the success of maximum entropy in statistical mechanics should be simply considered a lucky instance in which a physical scale (the Planck constant) provides the "right" metrics in which the phase space cells are equiprobable.
In the following example I will use uniform and normal priors, which are reasonable for the problems considered.
An example: uncertainty due to unknown systematic error of the instrument scale offset
In our scheme any influence quantity of which we do not know the exact value is a source of systematic error. It will change the final distribution of µ and hence its uncertainty. Let us take the case of the "zero" of an instrument, the value of which is never known exactly, due to limited accuracy and precision of the calibration. This lack of perfect knowledge can be modeled assuming that the zero "true value" Z is normally distributed around 0 (i.e. the calibration was properly done!) with a standard deviation σ Z . As far as µ is concerned, one may attribute the same degree of belief to all of its possible values. We can then take a uniform distribution defined over a large interval, chosen according to the characteristics of the measuring device and to our expectation on µ. An alternative choice of vague priors could be a normal distribution with large variance and a reasonable average (the values have to be suggested by the best available knowledge of the measurand and of the experimental devices). For simplicity, a uniform distribution is chosen in this example.
As far as f (x|µ, z) is concerned, we may assume that, for all possible values of µ and z, the degree of belief for each value of the measured quantity x can be described by a normal distribution with an expected value µ + z and variance σ 
For each z of the instrument offset we have a set of degrees of belief on µ:
Weighting f (µ|z) with degrees of belief on z using (3) we finally obtain
The result is that f (µ) is still a gaussian, but with a variance larger than that due only to statistical effects. The global standard deviation is the quadratic combination of that due to the statistical fluctuation of the data sample and that due to the imperfect knowledge of the systematic effect:
This formula is well known and widely used, although nobody seems to care that it cannot be justified by conventional statistics. It is interesting to notice that in this framework it makes no sense to speak of "statistical" and "systematical" uncertainties, as if they were of a different nature. They are all treated probabilistically. But this requires the concept of probability to be related to lack of knowledge, and not simply to the outcome of repeated experiments. This is in agreement with the classification in Type A and Type B of the components of the uncertainty, recommended by the BIPM.
If one has several sources of systematic errors, each related to an influence quantity, and such that their variations around their nominal values produce linear variations to the measured value, then the "usual" combination of variances (and covariances) is obtained (see [1] for details).
If several measurements are affected by the same unknown systematic error, their results are expected to be correlated. For example, considering only two measured values x 1 and x 2 of the true values µ 1 and µ 2 , the likelihood is 
The correlation coefficient is positively defined, as the definition of the systematic error considered here implies. Furthermore, as expected, several values influenced by the same unknown systematic error are correlated when the uncertainty due to the systematic error is comparable to -or larger than -the uncertainties due to sampling effects alone.
Conclusions
Bayesian statistics is closer to the physicist's mentality and needs than one may naïvely think. A Bayesian theory of measurement uncertainty has the simple and important role of formalizing what is often done, more or less intuitively, by experimentalists in simple cases, and to give guidance in more complex situations.
As far as the choice of the priors and the interpretation of conditional probability are concerned, it seems to me that, although it may look paradoxical at first sight, the "subjective" approach (à la de Finetti) has the best chance of achieving consensus among the scientific community (after some initial resistance due to cultural prejudices).
